Vanina Biasi: Hate Speech or Political Criticism? – By Francesca Chocano Villanueva

Vanina Biasi: Hate Speech or Political Criticism?

On April 7, 2025, Federal Judge Daniel Eduardo Rafecas of Federal Court No. 3, Secretariat 5, issued an indictment without pretrial detention against National Deputy Vanina Natalia Biasi in case CFP 4209/2023, titled "Biasi, Vanina s/ inf. ley 23.592". The complaint was filed by Prosecutor Carlos Stornelli, who argued that the deputy's publications on the social media X could constitute discriminatory propaganda and incitement to hatred against the Jewish community.

This incident reopens the debate in Argentina about the boundaries between legitimate political criticism and hate speech, highlighting the tension between freedom of expression and the state's obligation to protect historically persecuted groups.

What Did Vanina Biasi Say?

Between November 2023 and January 2024, the deputy published a total of seven messages on her X account that led to the complaint filed by Carlos Stornelli, head of the Federal National Prosecutor's Office for Criminal and Correctional Matters No. 4. In these messages, the deputy accused Israel of being a "Nazi State" due to its practices and ideology. She also claimed that Zionism constructs a false narrative in which the occupier presents itself as the victim, and she compared Israeli policies with Nazi tactics. Below is a detailed account of each message.

Arguments Behind the Indictment

The indictment largely adopted the arguments put forward by Prosecutor Carlos Stornelli in his complaint, which are outlined below. First, Stornelli argued that the expressions exceeded the scope of freedom of expression protected by the National Constitution and international human rights treaties (CFP 4209/2023, p. 2). He maintained that these were not merely isolated political opinions or legitimate criticisms of the Israeli government but rather a discursive campaign employing offensive stereotypes, analogies with Nazism, and unfounded accusations of genocide, which would dehumanize a specific religious group.

Secondly, he referenced the definition of antisemitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) (CFP 4209/2023, p. 9), which includes as antisemitic expressions the comparison of Israel to the Nazis or the denial of the Jewish people's right to self-determination. This guideline was used as the primary parameter by the prosecution to interpret the content and impact of the tweets.

Furthermore, Stornelli structured his accusation based on the “3D” test (Demonization, Delegitimization and Double Standard) to analyze the discourse (CFP 4209/2023, p. 6). According to this approach, several of the publications engaged in demonization (by portraying the State of Israel as genocidal or Nazi), delegitimization (by denying its existence as a legitimate state), and double standards (by judging Israel by standards not applied to to other states).

Judge Rafecas echoed these arguments in his ruling but expanded the analysis with additional dimensions. First, he validated the application of the IHRA definition, agreeing with Stornelli that comparisons of Israel to Nazism and the denial of its right to self-determination were antisemitic expressions. He reinforced this point by incorporating the report of Dr. Juan Antonio Travieso, director of the Observatory against Antisemitism at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), who noted that Biasi's statements constitute a "demonization of the Jewish people and the State of Israel, using dehumanizing and malign descriptions consistent with classic antisemitic doctrine" (CFP 4209/2023, p. 8). Along these same lines, Rafecas also explicitly explored the link between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. While the prosecution merely noted that Biasi's criticisms exceeded freedom of expression, Rafecas argued that, in this specific case, "when reference is made to the State of Israel or the Zionist movement, it is inextricably linked to the Jewish community. Both concepts are intimately related, leading to questions about the extent to which the speaker is protected by freedom of expression or, conversely, is committing the offense provided for by law no. 23.592"(CFP 4209/2023, p. 39).

Regarding the "3D" test, Rafecas not only accepted the application proposed by the prosecution but also integrated it into a broader and more comprehensive reasoning. In his ruling, the judge combined multiple analytical tools to conclude that Biasi's expressions fall within the type of hate speech that, according to Article 13.5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, can be legitimately restricted. Thus, he added to the 3D test the IHRA definition of antisemitism and the national context marked by the attacks on the AMIA and the Israeli Embassy, stating that "this circumstance, due to its historical gravity, tips the balance in favor of the accusatory hypothesis" (CFP 4209/2023, p. 53).

Rafecas directly refers to the Rabat Plan of Action, adopted by the United Nations as a guide to assess when speech meets the threshold of direct incitement to violence. The Plan establishes six criteria to consider when an expression should be regarded as hate speech: 6) The social and political context in which the expression occurred, 1) The identity of the speaker, 2) The intent of the speaker, 3) The content and form of the expression, 4) The extent of the dissemination, and 5) The likelihood of violence, discrimination, or hostility resulting from the expression (CFP 6/4209, p. 2023). When applied in conjunction with the "36D" test, these criteria demonstrate how, in these cases, the expressions go beyond mere political criticism and constitute incitement to hatred. In Rafecas' words, Biasi's expressions are not only disproportionate and dehumanizing, but also "advocate anti-Zionism as a denial of the Jewish people's right to self-determination in their ancestral land, which would inevitably lead to calls for their disappearance, thus constituting hate speech" (CFP 3/4209, p. 2023).

Another significant argument in Rafecas's reasoning was the continuity of discourse (CFP 4209/2023, p. 10). He argued that this was not an isolated message but rather at least seven posts between November and January, which he interpreted as a sustained pattern of incitement to hatred. Additionally, Biasi's position as a national deputy added gravity to the case, given her institutional responsibility and the broad audience her statements could reach.

Rafecas delves into the balance between freedom of expression and non-discrimination, citing scholars such as Badeni and Gargarella in section V.g. He recalls that, although freedom of expression is a fundamental right, it is not absolute. Following the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court (Article 13), he emphasized that it can be restricted when it conflicts with other rights, such as the equality and dignity of historically marginalized groups.

Finally, as a precautionary measure, he ordered a lien of 10 million Argentine pesos on the deputy's assets to ensure potential compensation if the case leads to a conviction.

A Necessary Debate: Where Are the Limits?

Biasi's prosecution is not an isolated incident. A recent precedent is the case of Alejandro Bodart, a leader of the Socialist Workers' Movement, who was sentenced in January of this year to six months of suspended imprisonment. In 2022, he published a series of tweets in which he described Israel as a "racist and genocidal state" and equated Zionism with Nazism. Initially acquitted in two instances, the Buenos Aires Criminal Chamber overturned his acquittal, arguing that his expressions delegitimized the existence of Israel and promoted hostility toward the Jewish community. Bodart's defense, for its part, argued that his statements constituted legitimate political criticism and not incitement to hatred.

Thus, it is clear that the central tension in these cases revolves around the boundary between political freedom of expression and the prohibition of speech that incites hatred or discrimination. In the Biasi case, supporters of the prosecution argue that the representative's expressions are not merely political opinions but disproportionate, demonizing, and stigmatizing accusations against the Jewish community. For them, collectively attributing genocidal and Nazi practices to "Zionism" dehumanizes the community and fosters intolerance. Furthermore, her status as a national deputy enhances the reach and gravity of her words, since as a public figure, her messages reach a wide audience and can influence the social perception of a historically vulnerable group.

In contrast, Biasi's defense warns of the risks of limiting freedom of expression, emphasizing that criticizing Zionism as an ideology or the policies of the Israeli government does not equate to inciting religious hatred. From this perspective, anti-Zionism can be a legitimate stance in public debate, and conflating it with antisemitism poses a risk of criminalizing controversial political ideas. Such criminalization of speech would have a chilling effect, where critical voices self-censor for fear of criminal sanctions.

However, in the prosecution, Argentina's historical factor plays an important role. The attacks on the AMIA (1994) and the Israeli Embassy (1992) constituted a painful past for the country (CFP 4209/2023, p. 53). However, that historical memory also demands rigor in distinguishing between radical criticism of a state or ideology and manifestations of irrational hatred. In this sense, protecting the Jewish community from anti-Zionist expressions cannot become a pretext to censor political dissent.

Final Thoughts

The resolution of this case will not only define Biasi's legal situation but also set a precedent regarding the scope and limits of public debate in Argentina. The question that remains is whether criminal law should intervene in the face of radical political expression or if, conversely, its use in such cases threatens to undermine democratic deliberation.

It is pertinent here to question whether legal instruments such as Law 23.592 and, on a regional level, the Inter-American Convention against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance manage to balance the protection of vulnerable groups with the guarantee of freedom of expression. As noted Schatzky and Vitaliani in their analysis of the Convention, the risk lies in the broad definitions of "intolerance" or "hate speech" potentially criminalizing legitimate political expressions. In Biasi's case, the application of Article 3 of Law 23.592 could exemplify this tension. While the Prosecution and the Court interpret her statements as incitement to hatred, the defense insists that they constitute political criticism of Zionism as an ideology. While it is imperative to protect minorities from speech that promotes violence or dehumanization, as Schatzky and Vitaliani warn, the ambiguity of these norms could turn criminal law into a covert censorship tool, openly contradicting the standards of the IACHR.

Protecting minorities from hate speech is a state obligation. However, this duty cannot invalidate the right to criticize governments, ideologies, or political symbols. Based on the justification developed by the Court, the argument that some of Biasi's statements (especially those comparing the State of Israel to Nazism) could fall into a form of speech that, although cloaked in political terms, may incite hatred. In this discussion, it is also important to consider the IACHR standard, as explained by Abramovich, only speeches that imply clear, specific, and imminent risk of violence can be excluded from the protection of Article 13 of the American Convention. Even in those cases, the possibility of prior censorship is a matter of debate. Similarly, Zuckerman and Rajendra-Nicolucci warn that the use of punitive mechanisms against controversial speech can undermine democratic legitimacy, especially if there is no citizen participation or clear criteria justifying the intervention. Here, the challenge remains to preserve the margins of democratic dissent without allowing the penalization of language to become a covert censorship tool. 

In times of polarization and social media, it is urgent to find a balance between protecting those who have historically been vulnerable and allowing vigorous criticism within the democratic framework.

We thank Karen Arévalo for her valuable contribution in the preparation of this document.